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Abstract This paper establishes grounds on which attribu-
tions of information and encoding in animal signals are war-
ranted. As common interest increases between evolution-
ary agents, the theoretical approach best suited to describ-
ing their interaction shifts from evolutionary game theory
to communication theory, which warrants informational lan-
guage. The take-home positive message is that in coopera-
tive settings, signals can appropriately be described as trans-
mitting encoded information, regardless of the cognitive pow-
ers of signallers. The canonical example is the honey bee
waggle dance, which is discussed extensively in sections 2
and 3. The take-home negative message is that signals are
not always a consequence of coadaptation. The communica-
tion theory approach is just one end of a continuum explored
more thoroughly by evolutionary game theory. Sections 4
and 5 explore this wider framework, as well as overturning
some widely held misconceptions about information theory.
Keywords Animal communication; Behavioural ecology;
Communication theory; Evolutionary game theory;
Teleosemantics
1 Introduction: the information debate in behavioural
ecology
This paper establishes grounds on which attributions of in-
formation in animal signals are warranted. Informational lan-
guage is most appropriate when signalling behaviour is the
result of coadaptation. Animal interactions are more gener-
ally understood through the lens of evolutionary game the-
ory. As common interest increases between evolutionary agents,
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the theoretical approach best suited to describing their in-
teraction shifts from game theory to communication theory,
which warrants informational language.
The paper proceeds in a slightly unusual form. The re-
mainder of this section is given over to outlining the context
of the controversy surrounding information concepts in be-
havioural ecology. Then, a very early information-theoretic
approach to animal signalling, which provides an informa-
tional measurement of the honey bee waggle dance, is de-
scribed in section 2. In section 3 some recent mathematical
objections to that early work are rebutted. Then in section 4
wider sceptical arguments concerning the use of informa-
tional concepts in animal communication theory are con-
sidered. Although the outlook is generally positive, scepti-
cal arguments are only partly rejected. Finally, in section 5
prospects for extending the use of informational concepts to
other animal signals are considered. Although several lines
of scepticism have been conflated and some are inappropri-
ate, there remain grounds for caution. Section 6 concludes.
Overall, several lines of argument are presented in favour
of the use of information theory for studying certain bio-
logical communication systems. Throughout, a positive pro-
posal is advanced for the interpretation of information in bi-
ological signals. Information is a measure of the accuracy
with which a receiver’s goal is achieved, or equivalently, the
extent to which a receiver’s biological capacity is realised.
In our case study, which focuses on the waggle dance of the
honey bee Apis mellifera, the goal is finding food. Insofar
as receiver bees have a greater probability of finding food
after having followed a dance, information is transmitted by
dancing bees. It is this notion of transmission that constitutes
grounds for application of the information concept, and re-
lated mathematical tools, in studies of biological signalling.
The take-home positive message is that the communica-
tion theory approach is a special case that emerges as sig-
naller and receiver interests become aligned. These consid-
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erations give grounds for optimism about the use of infor-
mational concepts and measurements in behavioural ecol-
ogy and, more generally, biology. Paradigmatic cases of in-
formation transmission are those in which the form of the
signal is designed by coadaptation of signaller and receiver.
In these cases, signal structure can appropriately described
in terms of a ‘code’. Consequently, the take-home negative
message is that signals are not always shaped exclusively
by coadaptation. The communication theory approach is just
one end of a continuum explored more thoroughly by evolu-
tionary game theory. As a result, signal form may not always
be explicable by reference to encoding, at least not as it is
now understood. Whether or not signals are manipulative or
coadaptive will be an empirical question in each case.
1.1 Background
By the late 1970’s, animal signals were typically defined
in terms of information. Signal evolution was thought to
mainly proceed via ritualisation of cues. Since ritualisation
is a process of coadaptation, signals were viewed as primar-
ily cooperative, despite the possibility of deception and ex-
ploitation. In the face of this orthodoxy, Dawkins and Krebs
(1978) offered a different approach. They proposed that com-
munication be seen as one animal controlling another, typi-
cally by exploiting perceptual mechanisms designed for other
purposes. Due to the individualistic operation of natural se-
lection, cooperation and coadaptation are rare (Dawkins and
Krebs, 1978: 289). Consequently, we should adopt an indi-
vidualistic account of communication, one that places the
signaller front and centre.
More recently, in a series of individual and joint papers,
Michael J. Owren, Drew Rendall and Michael J. Ryan (here-
after ORR) present significant challenges to the use of infor-
mational concepts in animal communication studies (Ren-
dall et al., 2009; Owren et al., 2010; Rendall and Owren,
2013; Ryan, 2013). Information, they claim, is an insub-
stantial metaphor that cannot do explanatory work and often
misleads us as to the nature of signalling behaviour. Several
behavioural ecology texts go so far as to define communica-
tion in terms of information, without ever fully explicating
the latter (see Rendall et al. (2009: Table 1) for examples).
Instead, ORR propose a definition of signalling akin to that
of Dawkins and Krebs, in terms of the influence one ani-
mal exerts over another.1 Further scepticism is advanced by
Sarkar (2013), who discusses the honey bee waggle dance
along with wider issues of animal signalling. Sarkar claims
1 Stegmann’s edited volume (Stegmann, 2013a) characterises the
debate as between information-based and influenced-based definitions.
However, as pointed out by several entries in that volume, information
and influence do not form a strict dichotomy. Here I am primarily con-
cerned with establishing grounds for the attribution of information, so
I make little mention of influence-based definitions.
different informational concepts have been conflated in the
literature, and that as a result informational measurements
do not capture the quantities claimed by those who employ
them.
It is in the light of this scepticism that the present pa-
per is offered. The honey bee waggle dance is one of the
most thoroughly studied animal communication systems in
nature. It is characterised by an unusually high level of com-
mon interest which, I argue below, renders it suitable for
informational analysis. We shall first describe one informa-
tional measurement of the honey bee waggle dance (section
2) and respond to preliminary mathematical objections as to
its validity (section 3). We will then face the problems raised
by ORR, Sarkar and others that apply more forcefully when
we consider instances of communication not characterised
by high common interest.
2 The honey bee waggle dance
“The” honey bee waggle dance is rather a family of commu-
nicative behaviours performed by all seven species of honey
bee (Beekman et al., 2015: 1). Six species are native to South
East Asia, but the seventh – the Western honey bee, Apis
mellifera – is widespread in Europe, Africa and Asia and
has been domesticated since antiquity, making it uniquely
amenable to scientific study. Western honey bees perform
the waggle dance when foraging and searching for new nest
sites. The works discussed in the present paper focus on A.
mellifera foraging at artificial feeders and performing the
waggle dance on a vertical surface inside the hive (see for
example von Frisch (1950: 76-7)). It is in this context that I
use the term “honey bee waggle dance”.
When individual bees discover a valuable food source, it
is often beneficial to recruit nestmates as soon as possible.
Competition from other foragers, and the brief duration of
flowering, set important time constraints. A bee who finds
a good flower patch will often try to direct available work-
ers to that location. Indicating direction and distance on the
vertical inner surface of a pitch-black hive is no mean feat.
Bees nonetheless succeed by performing repeated patterns
of figure-8 movement whose detectable features – orienta-
tion and duration – correspond to the direction and distance
of the food source (see figure 1). This is the waggle dance,
so called because the bee’s body vibrates during the straight
portion of the figure-8 run with a frequency corresponding
to the quality of food discovered. Interested recruits phys-
ically follow the dancer to familiarise themselves with the
direction and distance indicated, before flying off to locate
the relevant food patch.
Informally, the dance is a signal about the location of
food. Behavioural ecologists advert to the correspondence
between dance and food when explaining foraging behaviour
of hive recruits (von Frisch, 1950: 78) (Riley et al., 2005:
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Fig. 1 How the waggle dance indicates the direction of food. Caption
from the original image: “A waggle run oriented 45◦ to the right of ‘up’
on the vertical comb (A) indicates a food source 45◦ to the right of the
direction of the sun outside the hive (B). The abdomen of the dancer
appears blurred because of the rapid motion from side to side. (Figure
design: J. Tautz and M. Kleinhenz, Beegroup Wu¨rzburg.)” (Chittka,
2004: 898)
205) (Biesmeijer and Seeley, 2005: 133) (Beekman et al.,
2015: 1). Indeed, much work on honey bees after von Frisch
was geared towards demonstrating that these explanations
were correct (Gould, 1975). That recruits are capable of find-
ing food at a rate better than chance having followed the rel-
evant dance is an established fact.2 The present work uses
2 It is less clear how useful the dance is across different contexts, and
the purpose for which it originally evolved. Several lines of evidence
count in favour of nest site selection as the significant factor (Beekman
et al., 2008; I’Anson Price and Gru¨ter, 2015). For simplicity I regret-
fully ignore this possibility.
the foraging waggle dance as a case study in the application
of information theory to animal communication. We shall
assume that recruits who follow the dance find the indicated
food source at better than chance and that the dance evolved
for this reason.
The next subsection surveys the earliest attempt to mea-
sure information transmission in the waggle dance. Section
3 describes and responds to recent objections.
2.1 Haldane & Spurway (1954)
In this section I build a positive case for the relevance of
informational measurements to selective explanation. The
claim is illustrated with a case study of the honey bee wag-
gle dance, whose informational properties were first mea-
sured by Haldane and Spurway (1954). I will now describe
the aims, methods and conclusions of that study.
Haldane & Spurway wanted to demonstrate the possi-
bility of deriving informational properties from statistical
data. They used honey bee communication as an example
because von Frisch had already published the relevant statis-
tics (von Frisch, 1948, 1950, 1952). By 1954, mathematical
communication theory (MCT) offered a new perspective on
this data from an engineering viewpoint. At the heart of the
motivation for the study was the possibility of comparison
with other animals. It was hoped that the way information
is measured, and the generality of the units of information,
might allow for the magnitude of information transmission
to be compared between communication systems. Indeed,
soon after the study was published Wilson (1962) obtained
similar statistical and informational data for fire ants, ex-
plicitly comparing his results with those of the earlier work.
Whether or not this comparison was valid is discussed below
in section 4.3.
Although contemporary work on biological information
drawing on MCT typically begins by citing Shannon (1948a,b)
or Shannon and Weaver (1949), Haldane & Spurway took
their leave from Norbert Wiener’s Cybernetics (Wiener, 1948).
Wiener’s approach emphasises intra-system control over inter-
system communication. Since a honey bee colony may fruit-
fully be construed as a more or less unified entity with uni-
fied goals, it is appropriate to take a cybernetical approach
to its behaviour.3
Haldane and Spurway (1954: 255) use just one equation
to measure information. It is a formula that converts two
pieces of statistical data (representing receiver behaviour)
into a term for information transmitted by senders. The con-
version works as follows. Suppose a group of receivers are
about to embark on a foraging run. In the absence of ex-
perience they will tend to spread themselves evenly around
3 Haldane and Wiener knew each other personally. For some inter-
esting remarks on their relationship, see Dronamraju’s recent biogra-
phy of Haldane (Dronamraju, 2017: p.259-60).
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the foraging domain. Their spatial distribution is represented
by a uniform probability distribution (figure 2A). This is
the first piece of statistical data, generated by the modelling
assumption that bees without information forage randomly.
Note that this is a continuous distribution. The foraging do-
main has not been segmented into discrete ‘cells’, each with
some nonzero probability of being arrived at. Rather, any
given region—of any size—has a nonzero probability of be-
ing visited. Now consider how receiver bees are distributed
when they react to a dance. Instead of dispersing randomly
throughout the domain, they all fly in roughly the same di-
rection (figure 2B). This is the second piece of statistical
data, generated by the observed distribution of recruits which
is assumed to be Gaussian. This too is a continuous function.
The ‘most popular’ direction is the direction of food, but
some receiver bees will be a little inaccurate. The conver-
sion equation translates these two distributions into a quan-
tity of information, which can be interpreted as the informa-
tion provided by senders about the direction of food. It is
calculated as follows.
The conversion equation is derived from two formulas
taken from Shannon (1948b). These formulas give the en-
tropy of a Gaussian distribution (Shannon, 1948b: 630) and
the information rate of a continuous channel (Shannon, 1948b:
637). Haldane & Spurway combine the two into a single
equation giving the information rate of a continuous channel
when the source entropy is uniform and the conditional en-
tropy is Gaussian. The most perspicuous form of this equa-
tion is due to Wilson (1962: Appendix, p. 156) and I present
it here (the units are bits per signal):
Information rate= log2
360◦
σ◦
− log2
√
2pie (1)
Here, σ represents the standard deviation of the Gaussian
distribution. Informally, it measures the ‘spread’ of receiver
bees about the food source. Granted that receivers can be
represented by a Gaussian, σ is the only statistic required to
calculate information rate.4
An equivalent way of conceiving the situation is to take
the uniform distribution as a ‘prior’ and the Gaussian as a
‘posterior’. Before the dance, receiver bees are maximally
uncertain about the location of food, hence the prior distri-
bution is uniform. After the dance, the receiver bees’ un-
certainty has decreased. The magnitude of the decrease in
uncertainty is a relation between the Gaussian and uniform
distributions.5
4 The appropriate measure for the Gaussian is presented in Shan-
non and Weaver (1949: 89). Haldane & Spurway cite Wiener (1948:
62) who provides a general formulation of information in a continuous
distribution and does not appear to discuss the Gaussian case explicitly.
For a derivation (and explanation) of the equation used by Haldane and
Spurway (1954: 255) see Wilson (1962: Appendix).
5 In fact the von Mises distribution would have been more appro-
priate (Schu¨rch and Ratnieks, 2015). The Gaussian is an acceptable
approximation.
By the method just described, Haldane & Spurway de-
rive a quantity of information about the direction in which
food can be found. Substituting the standard deviation of
14.7◦ (Haldane and Spurway, 1954: 251) into equation 1,
they conclude that each recruit receives on average 2.5 bits
(Haldane and Spurway, 1954: 278) of information about the
direction of food. It is worth pointing out that this analysis
goes through regardless of facts about cognitive powers of
individual bees. On the cybernetic interpretation, informa-
tion is a measure of how behavioural precision contributes
to system goals. Cognitive sophistication can be included or
omitted from models of communication, without bearing on
the presence of information in signalling systems. The same
is true of sender-receiver models in general (Skyrms, 2010:
44).
Why is this method justified in the case of honey bees?
If a colony is an entity with unified evolutionary goals, it is
plausible to think senders obtain a payoff for receiver suc-
cess. Since receiver success increases when information is
transmitted, the dance evolves because of the information it
provides. In other words, when ‘information’ is construed
in terms of accuracy, information rate is selected for. Nature
plausibly selects for accuracy under the circumstances bee
colonies have historically found themselves in. On this inter-
pretation, selection has led to increased information trans-
mission. This is one route to explaining the increased ar-
ticulation in the waggle dance over phylogenetically ear-
lier kinds of dance. If articulation supports greater infor-
mation transmission, and information rate is selected for,
then articulation can be selected for its informational con-
sequences. Of course, adaptation is always subject to con-
straints, and the quantity of information transmitted cannot
increase indefinitely (Preece and Beekman, 2014). Nonethe-
less, it is justifiably claimed that the benefits of foraging ac-
curacy historically underpinned selection for greater infor-
mation transmission in the honey bee waggle dance.
In sum, Haldane & Spurway established that informa-
tional measures can be derived from statistical data. They
justified their use of a measure taken from MCT by adopt-
ing a cybernetic perspective on honey bee colonies. To the
extent that a colony’s communicative goals are unified, this
approach is justified. Since 1954 more work in a similar
vein has appeared (Riley et al., 2005; Beekman et al., 2015;
Schu¨rch and Ratnieks, 2015). Regardless of differing re-
sults, what matters here is whether Haldane & Spurway’s
model was a good one and whether their interpretation of
information was valid. I have so far argued that the answer
to both of these questions is yes. The next section responds
to two objections.
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A Without signal
Probability
360◦
Direction
B With signal
Probability
360◦
Direction
Fig. 2 How directional information in the waggle dance is measured.
A. Without experience, bees are expected to disperse randomly (blue dots) about the hive (black disc). This can be represented by a uniform
distribution (blue circle) around the hive. The same distribution in Cartesian coordinates is also presented.
B. After receiving a signal, receiver bees are much more biased toward the direction indicated by the dance. This situation is represented as a
Gaussian distribution. Information transmission is measured by subtracting the entropy of (B) from the entropy of (A) (see equation 1, page 4 for
details).
Although individual entropies are quantified relative to the coordinate system (here 360 degrees per circle), information rate is not relativised in
this way (Shannon, 1948b: p. 631).
3 Initial objections to Haldane & Spurway
Scepticism of the validity of these results continues (Pfeifer,
2006; Sarkar, 2013). Even optimistic scholars, as well as
those on the fence, cite Pfeifer (2006) as having presented
technical challenges to the use of information theory in bi-
ology (Reading, 2011: p.149 fn.6) (Stegmann, 2013b: 143)
(Wiley, 2013: 118). I aim to show that although there surely
will be technical and methodological hurdles, they are not
the ones presented by these objections.
3.1 Objection 1: Arbitrary coordinate systems
In this section I show how the bee dance is both iconic and
continuous and how signals of this kind contain measurable
information. This undercuts one sceptical argument against
the use of information theory for animal signals in general,
and the bee dance in particular, namely that the models we
employ to quantify signal information are somehow arbi-
trary. Discrete models appear to be arbitrary, but continuous
models do not suffer from the same defect.
The sceptical argument due to Pfeifer (2006) and re-
peated by Sarkar (2013: §7.3) runs as follows. Honey bee
signals indicate, among other things, the direction of a food
source relative to the hive. The quantity of information about
direction in a signal depends on how precise the signal is.
When modelling bee signals, therefore, the amount of in-
formation we will obtain depends on how finely we carve
up ‘direction space’. But we have no a priori guidance as
to how finely to carve up the space. Differents divisions
will give different measures of information, but none will
have priority. Sarkar suggests we could test for individual
bees’ perceptual acuity, and divide the space into segments
of a size roughly discriminable by the bees themselves. He
claims Haldane & Spurway did not do this, and that even if
they had, the placement of these individual direction-segments
would have been arbitrary. By shifting them a half-step clock-
wise, we obtain a totally new division of direction space,
which will transform our statistical data into different in-
formational measurements. Since no carving of the space is
privileged, there can be no privileged conversion of statisti-
cal data into informational quantities. As a result, informa-
tion measurements are to some extent arbitrary, and cannot
be relevant for selective explanation.
To make the objection clearer, consider one of Pfeifer’s
models (Pfeifer, 2006: 325). Suppose there are three types
of bee, E, F and G.6 They each need to signal the location
of food, and each signal indicates a direction around a circle
6 The original example mentioned ants. Here and below I substitute
bees without loss of generality. I retain the alphabetical labelling of
types for ease of comparison with Pfeifer’s article. Space precludes
discussion of model ABCD.
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centred on the nest. Further, they differ in the probabilities
of signalling in each direction, as per figure 3.
Described this way, each type transmits a certain amount
of information on average:
– E: 1.971 bits/signal
– F: 1.971 bits/signal
– G: 1.985 bits/signal
We see that G transmits more than E and F on average. How-
ever, if response behaviour is distributed uniformly about
the segments, we can individuate signals by cardinal points
instead, as per figure 4. Described this alternative way, the
information measurements are:
– E: 2 bits/signal
– F: 1.985 bits/signal
– G: 1.996 bits/signal7
Notice that the order of greater/lesser information transmis-
sion has changed. Now E transmits more than G types, fol-
lowed by F types last. The subsequent argument is fairly
obvious. If signal individuation is down to the modeller’s
discretion, and information measures are sensitive to indi-
viduation, then information transmission is model-relative.
Though there are many ways for depictions of the world
to be relativised to the model used to express them, and not
all render hypotheses inconsequential, the kind of relativity
implied by this objection is problematic. A selective hypoth-
esis is supposed to pick out a property and state why it per-
sists in the lineage. In this case, the property is the quantity
of information contained within signals. If that quantity can-
not be said to be greater or lesser except relative to the model
chosen to represent the signal, we need indepedent grounds
on which to choose one model over another. Pfeifer claims
we have no such grounds since no carving of the space is
privileged (Pfeifer, 2006: p.325 col.1): “if different ways
of carving signals result in different orderings of the mea-
surements, then it is unclear how the measure could be used
in explaining how information transmission is selected for.”
As a result, no selective hypothesis adverting to information
transmission is recommended over any other.
3.2 Response to objection 1
There are two ways to read the objection. I will argue it fails
in either case. On the first reading, it turns out recarving the
space does not alter the informational measurement. The ob-
jection fails on mathematical grounds. On the second read-
ing, recarving the space alters the measurement as required,
but some carvings will more accurately match the facts than
others. Selective hypotheses adverting to informational mea-
surements are then verifiable, establishing the required link
7 A typo in the published version of Pfeifer (2006: 325) erroneously
cites this value as 1.96 bits/signal.
between model and reality. The objection fails on both read-
ings. Moreover, the dilemma is not accidental. It is a reflec-
tion of Pfeifer’s assumption that signals are discrete and in-
dicate direction symbolically. In fact, signals in this system
are continuous and indicate direction iconically.
Consider the first reading. The objection rests on statisti-
cal differences between the two carvings. However, the sec-
ond partitioning does not seem to have the entropy assumed
by the second informational calculation. If the distribution
of insects across each partition in the first carving is uni-
form, the distributions in the second will not be uniform.
To see this, consider figure 5 (top row). Blue lines repre-
sent insects observed in each segment as a proportion of to-
tal insects observed. These densities would not change even
after the partitions are shifted, so the new distributions are
non-uniform lines with a step-change in the middle of each
partition. The information rate derived from such stepped
distributions is the same as that calculated from the origi-
nal partitioning. As a result, the proposed calculation is in-
correct and does not have the consequence that information
measurements are model-relative.
There is another way to read the objection, however.
Suppose the scientist was faced with a choice of partition to
use while conducting the experiment. They can set up their
four detectors in either of the two configurations depicted by
model EFG. Due to restrictions in the precision of the detec-
tors, they are forced to assume a uniform distribution within
each segment in either case (figure 5, bottom row). Given
these conditions, it is true that a scientist who opts for the
first configuration would derive different informational mea-
surements than one who chooses the second. Different selec-
tive hypotheses result, but one hypothesis will be better. One
carving entails more accurate modelling assumptions, since
the regions it describes in fact have a more uniform distribu-
tion of insects passing through. Alternatively, both carvings
could be equally wrong. This is importantly different from
being arbitrary, since there will be some other carving that
is better than both. In any event, a more precise detection
method would capture more fine-grained insect movements,
giving rise to more accurate informational calculations.
The objection fails on both readings, a dilemma that brings
out a key difference between model EFG and the model used
by Haldane & Spurway. The latter employed a discrete ap-
proximation of a continuous model, using an equation of
continuous rather than discrete entropy. Although the statis-
tic they plugged into the equation was derived from an ex-
periment using discrete partitions, it is a different way of
modelling the situation than that typified by EFG. Discrete
approximations to continuous models become more accu-
rate as they become more fine-grained (Schu¨rch and Rat-
nieks, 2015: Figure 1, p.3). If the insects of model EFG were
observed again using detectors capable of distinguishing 8,
16 or 32 partitions, the resulting information measurement
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E
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.2
F
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.3
G
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.25
Fig. 3 Signal probabilities for model EFG
E
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.25
F
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.25
G
0.225
0.25
0.275
0.25
Fig. 4 Signal probabilities for model EFG, alternative description
Model EFG (type E): first reading
Model EFG (type E): second reading
Fig. 5 Two ways of understanding objection 1. The first entails the
same informational results for both carvings. The objection is then in-
correct on mathematical grounds. The second entails different infor-
mational results, but different falsifiable assumptions. The objection
fails because the models’ assumptions are verifiable, not arbitrary in
the manner required for the objection to go through.
would become more precise. It would not increase indefi-
nitely, as per Pfeifer’s approach.
To reiterate, Pfeifer introduces a situation in which sig-
nals are discrete and represent directions symbolically. Her
objection is then that we cannot possibly come to know how
symbols and directions correspond, and any choice destroys
the link between model and reality. In contrast, the biologists
make the reasonable and widely accepted assumption that
bee signals are continuous and represent directions iconi-
cally. Once a continuous model is employed to represent a
signalling system, discrete partitions can be overlaid to re-
trieve data. The more fine-grained these partitions, the more
accurately the data captures the continuous model lying un-
derneath.
A different but equally mistaken conclusion might be
drawn from the equation used to convert statistical into in-
formational data. To measure the accuracy of the waggle
dance, Haldane & Spurway took a circle centred on the nest
and measured the proportion of that circle covered by insects
who had received a signal (recall figure 2 and equation 1). A
smaller circle proportion covered by food-seeking receivers
means more accurate communication, hence a greater amount
of information transferred. Pfeifer objects to the appearance
of the number 360 in equation 1:
It is assumed in both cases that there are 360 pos-
sible messages about direction corresponding to the
360 degrees surrounding the nests of the ants or bees
[but] it is not clear why they should be divided into
360 different possible signals, as opposed to 180,
720, or some other number. (Pfeifer, 2006: 342)
It is easy to see the problem if the objection hits its mark.
The division of circles into 360 equal segments is a human
convention. If it is used as the basis of an information cal-
culation, any derived quantities must be arbitrary as well.
Conventional measurements cannot enter into explanations
that pertain to natural selection, since nature is blind to our
conventions. Consequently the use of 360 in equation 1 is
inappropriate. Again, citing Pfeifer, Sarkar reiterates the ob-
jection (Sarkar, 2013: 196).
However, the interpretation of equation 1 that underpins
this argument is incorrect. The number 360 is employed only
as a convenience for the reader. The equations in which it
appears are designed to calculate the proportion of the cir-
cle covered by outgoing insects. Proportion is blind to the
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360◦
30◦
2pi radians
pi
6 radians
Fig. 6 The proportion of a circle covered by receiver insects can be
calculated using any units, whether degrees, radians, or as a fraction
of a turn. In equation 2, σ (Greek letter sigma) represents the angle
of the blue segment. Hence the first logarithm in equation 1 represents
the length of an arc as a proportion of the circumference of the circle,
which is not relative to the conventional measure of 360 degrees.
units used to calculate it since dimensions cancel in the di-
vision. Indeed, Haldane & Spurway first represent the full
angle in radians as 2pi before converting it to 360 degrees
for expository clarity (Haldane and Spurway, 1954: 255).
Unfortunately they use the same symbol, σ , in both cases,
making it less than obvious that the units have changed from
radians to degrees. Equation 2 and figure 6 demonstrate the
equivalence of these different measures.
Circle proportion=
360
σdegrees
=
2pi
σradians
(2)
As a result the use of the number 360 does not indicate
an assumption of 360 messages. It is true, however, that the
precision of the calculation increases as the precision of σ
increases. Pfeifer raises a related complaint that the statis-
tical data available to Haldane & Spurway are given in 15
degree increments, which is too coarse-grained to provide a
reliable measure. However, the biologists take this into ac-
count, and the error margins they give are consistent with
their estimations. As per Schu¨rch and Ratnieks (2015: 3),
more precise measurements would lead to more accurate
calculations. In sum, this objection is not sustained.
Overall then, the accusation of arbitrariness toward co-
ordinate systems used to measure the directional component
of the bee dance cannot be upheld. Continuous models are
available for use where appropriate. Haldane & Spurway
employed such a model. Though the literature on sender-
receiver models emphasises discrete signal sets, this is not
a necessary feature of the framework. Plausibly, many sig-
nals in nature can be profitably investigated with continuous
models. Discrete models are often best construed as approx-
imations to the underlying continuous representation. In the
next section I deal with a second major objection to the use
of information theory in the study of biological communica-
tion.
3.3 Objection 2: Precision and accuracy
In this section I show how quantifying information in sig-
nals is not just a case of quantifying the precision of re-
ceiver behaviour. One route to scepticism of the utility of
information theory in biology is based on the claim that be-
havioural precision does not entail accuracy, hence precision
alone entails nothing about fitness. I show that information
measurements, far from being solely a measure of precision,
are a quantification of accuracy. Accuracy, which in this case
translates into foraging efficiency, is clearly relevant for fit-
ness.
The objection, again due to Pfeifer, runs as follows. The
biologists used statistical data in their calculations. The statis-
tic they employed is the spatial distribution of signal re-
ceivers. A greater proportion of receivers clustered closer
to the target entails a greater quantity of information trans-
mitted. By measuring the difference between this more ‘fo-
cused’ distribution, and the otherwise random distribution of
receivers around the circle, the biologists quantify informa-
tion. Pfeifer complains that mere increased precision of re-
ceiver behaviour might not be selectively relevant. Suppose
bees clustered closely together in a region that lacked food.
Their behaviour would be focused in a statistical sense, yet
would not contribute to fitness. Behaviour can be highly spe-
cific yet selectively neutral, or even detrimental. To support
the objection Pfeifer presents model HIJ.
Suppose there are three kinds of bee, H, I and J, each
of which can signal to the east and west and do so with
equal probability. Suppose H types always go east when
signalled east and west when signalled west, but I types re-
spond improperly by going west when signalled east and
east when signalled west. In addition, J types go east with
probability 0.7 when signalled east, otherwise west, and vice
versa. The problem highlighted by this model is that H and
I types transmit the same amount of information, namely 1
bit/signal, whereas J types transmit much less, around 0.119
bits/signal. Despite this, we would expect J types to perform
better than I types because they successfully obtain food
more often on average. In consequence, it is unclear how
information transmission can have relevance for fitness.
3.4 Response to objection 2
We can respond to this objection by noting that the increased
‘focus’ of the posterior distribution is centred on a target that
has selective relevance, such as food. Wilson (1962) con-
firms that this assumption is encapsulated by the model. The
parameter used to measure information, σd , is directly rele-
vant for accuracy:
Note that σd refers to dispersion of following work-
ers with reference to the actual target and hence is a
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direct measure of the accuracy (content) of informa-
tion transmission. The honeybee data of von Frisch
and his co-workers are of this nature. (Wilson, 1962:
Appendix, p. 157, col. 1)
Insofar as receiver bees have a greater probability of finding
food after having watched a dance, information is transmit-
ted by dancing bees. It is this notion of transmission that
constitutes grounds for application of the information con-
cept, and related mathematical tools, in studies of biological
signalling.
What about model HIJ? It seems to show that biolo-
gists might inadvertently attribute a high rate of information
transmission to a colony that fails to put its signals to good
use. As a claim about methodology, this is implausible. If it
is assumed that signals used by type I are indeed food sig-
nals, it would be mysterious why receivers behave so aber-
rantly. Where the colony’s goal is finding food, signals gen-
erally increase the probability of doing so. When they do
not, they are selected against. I-type signals could hardly be
regarded as signals about food since the probability of find-
ing food is not raised when they are sent.
Like any piece of behaviour, a signal cannot be selected
for if it does not contribute to fitness. By hypothesis I-type
signals do not contribute to fitness, therefore they cannot
be selected for. As a result they would not contribute to a
behavioural ecologist’s selective hypothesis. They would be
simply anomalous.
To reiterate, the biologists’ models embody a crucial as-
sumption: that the target has selective relevance. In this sec-
tion, two mathematical objections have been overturned. I
now turn to broader considerations about the use of infor-
mational concepts in animal communication theory, paying
particular attention to the special nature of the honey bee
waggle dance and how the arguments presented here are af-
fected by weakening some of the assumptions required to
model it.
4 Wider considerations of the use of informational
concepts and measurements
As a result of the foregoing interpretation of honey bee sig-
nalling, we are in a position to consider several of ORR’s
challenges in a new light. As this paper is primarily defen-
sive, the alternative influence-based definition is not criti-
cally assessed. Nor do I consider systems in which animals
possess mental representations that may be used to produce
or interpret signals. I deal only with information in the sense
Kalkman (2017: 1) describes as an “ultimate explanatory
construct”. The target of explanation is fitness-improving
behaviour, including coordination of two or more agents. In
proceeding via minimal models of communication, nothing
need be assumed about cognitive sophistication. To be sure,
proponents of information in such signals as primate alarm
calls must face other challenges from ORR. I remain silent
on those aspects of the debate.
4.1 Defining information and encoding
The most pressing challenge to the optimist about informa-
tion is the lack of a clear definition of that concept in be-
havioural ecology. I introduce the challenge before respond-
ing to it. ORR point out that many authors use the quasi-
technical term in an unconstrained manner (Rendall et al.,
2009: table 2) (Rendall and Owren, 2013: table 6.1). As a
result those authors often switch between different concepts
masquerading under the same label, or gesture at unsubstan-
tiated explanations. In particular, authors often invoke “in-
formation” in a technical sense that quantifies correlations
between events. This Shannon information cannot be central
to definitions of signalling, however, because it can describe
any correlated events, biological or otherwise.
This distinction between the measurement of correla-
tions and a richer, semantic notion of information lies at the
heart of this debate and wider issues surrounding biological
information. The relevant Stanford Encyclopedia of Philos-
ophy article as of 2018 (Godfrey-Smith and Sterelny, 2016)
organises its exposition around two distinct approaches: “Shan-
non’s concept of information” and “Teleosemantic and other
richer concepts”. Sarkar (2013) distinguishes Shannon in-
formation (he calls it MCT-information) from semantic in-
formation, and repeats ORR’s contention that theorists of-
ten conflate the two. The distinction has also been flagged
as between “syntactic” and “semantic” information, the for-
mer being agnostic about the meaning of signals or symbols
whose transmission it quantifies (Morton and Coss, 2013:
p.211 & p.229). The consensus is clear: Shannon informa-
tion has no import for semantic information, and theorists do
wrong to conflate the two. Since invocations of information
are inconsistent, and nobody has provided a resolute defini-
tion, it seems better to dispense with the notion.
A similar fate befalls the concept of encoding. Signals
are sometimes said to carry information in a form that a re-
ceiver must decode in order to obtain. But it is rarely made
explicit what is meant by an ‘encoded messsage’ in a bio-
logical setting. By failing to specify what is being invoked,
theorists draw on a “vague, elastic and insubstantial” con-
cept (Owren et al., 2010: 758) that cannot do the explanatory
work required. As with “information”, then, talk of “encod-
ing” does more harm than good. Both can be discarded with-
out losing explanatory power. Rendall and Owren (2013:
171-2) make an even stronger claim: “Ultimately, notions
such as information and coding cannot be cashed out in terms
of standard concepts used in biological and evolutionary the-
ory.”
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One thing worth mentioning here is that ORR’s wider
aim, to critique anthropocentrism and linguistic metaphors
in animal signalling theory, is laudable. Animal communi-
cation should indeed be understood on its own terms, and
should not be treated as a pale imitation of human natu-
ral language. It is interesting, however, that ORR consider
the use of information theory to fall into this anthropomor-
phic paradigm, since several theorists present the story pre-
cisely the other way round. The ‘conduit metaphor’ which
ORR discuss is a term introduced by Reddy (1979) in part
to highlight the limitations of modelling human commu-
nication as an MCT channel. Reznikova (2017) introduces
information-theoretic methods in studies of communication
between ants, in an attempt to get away from language-inspired
metaphors and methodologies. Harms (2004) promotes for-
mal methods for capturing meaning without recourse to trans-
lation, since translating animal signals into human language
can only mislead us about the nature of meaning. All these
theorists note the disparity between MCT and human lan-
guage. Below I continue work in that tradition, arguing that
information theory is apt for generalisation to animal com-
munication theory precisely because it captures something
far more general than human engineering constructs. It should
become clear below that information theory, rightly inter-
preted, is no more anthropocentric than any other branch of
mathematics.
Claims about the irrelevance of information measures
for ‘semantic information’ are deeply mistaken, and are dis-
cussed in the next subsection. I want first to show that both
information and encoding are clearly defined in the honey
bee case. As discussed at length above, the measurement
of transmission rate captures the accuracy of receiver bees,
hence the efficiency of foraging behaviour. Haldane and Spur-
way’s insight was to define an entropy over the space of
relevant behavioural outcomes such that when entropy is
reduced by a communicative act, the measure of informa-
tion rate is simply a measure of successful functional per-
formance. This is an easy measurement to perform in the
honey bee case because foraging efficiency is linked to spa-
tial accuracy, and spatial accuracy is comparatively easy to
ascertain.
So information can be defined, at least in this case, in
terms of functional performance, rendering it both tractable
and relevant for selection. Consider now the concept of en-
coding. After a period of controversy in the middle of the
twentieth century, it became widely accepted that the differ-
ent components of the bee dance correspond to different spa-
tial relations between the hive and the indicated food source.
These aspects of the dance vary with those spatial relations
in a principled way. If they did not, receivers would be un-
able to reliably exploit the relevant food source. Although
there are several other factors affecting transmission rate,
the correspondence between spatial relations and dance fea-
tures – what I am here calling the code – clearly affects it
too. Consider the round dance, an alternative to the waggle
dance used when food sources are very close. This dance has
no directional component, meaning that on average its trans-
mission rate would be lower than the waggle dance. Greater
articulation affords greater transmission rate, which presum-
ably contributes to the explanation why the waggle dance
is articulated into different components. In general, then, a
code is a set of correspondences between signal and world,
designed so that receiver behaviour covaries aptly with the
state of the world.8
Below in section 5 I discuss prospects for extending these
definitions to cases of animal signalling not typically char-
acterised by common interest. Having demonstrated these
definitions, I must now clear up a deep misconception re-
garding the use of information theory in biology.
4.2 Information and meaning
One of the conceptual advances that heralded the develop-
ment of communication theory was the recognition that mean-
ing could be abstracted away from symbol sequences. Com-
mon interpretation of a symbol sequence means that all that
need be passed in order to effectively pass meaning is the se-
quence itself. Subsequently, measures of information were
defined in terms of the passability of the sequence, prohibit-
ing mention of any meaning it might be associated with.
This hallmark of the basic model of MCT is expressed by
Weaver’s oft-quoted warning:
The word information, in this theory, is used in a spe-
cial sense that must not be confused with its ordinary
usage. In particular, information must not be con-
fused with meaning. In fact, two messages, one of
which is heavily loaded with meaning and the other
of which is pure nonsense, can be exactly equivalent,
from the present viewpoint, as regards information.
(Shannon and Weaver, 1949: 8) (emphasis original)
Through Bar-Hillel and Carnap (1953), Dretske (1983),
Dennett (1983) and Krebs and Dawkins (1984)9, that warn-
ing found its way into the animal signalling literature. ORR
cite it unmodified (Rendall et al., 2009: p.240 col.2) (Owren
et al., 2010: 761), and Sarkar (2013: 193) reaffirms the senti-
ment. As mentioned above in section 4.1, the canonical view
8 This definition has pedigree from at least two sources. First, Mil-
likan’s definition of mapping rules between signal and world sustains
the requirement of codesign and takes as a canonical example the artic-
ulation of the waggle dance (Millikan, 1984: 107). Second, Skyrms’s
account of the evolutionary emergence of conventional meaning out-
lines the correspondence between signals and the behaviours they have
come, by coadaptation, to effect (Skyrms, 2010: §§3-5).
9 The closest I can find to the traditional irrelevance claim is on page
395: “Measurements of Shannon information do not necessarily reveal
anything about semantic information, although they often do.”
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in the philosophy of biology is that mathematical concepts
from information theory must be different from whatever is
meant by the ‘meaning of’ or ‘semantic information carried
by’ a biological signal.10
The central MCT model abstracts meaning away as de-
scribed above. But what was not recognised until much more
recently is that it smuggles in a different kind of meaning.
Codesgined signallers and receivers passing messages across
a medium are apt for a straightforward teleosemantic anal-
ysis. The encoded message of the MCT model fits this de-
scription perfectly. Regardless of the meaning of the original
symbol string, encoded messages posses the kind of mean-
ing Godfrey-Smith (2013) calls “subpersonal content”.11 En-
coded messages stand for the source message from which
they were derived. The code is shared between transmitter
and receiver as a consequence of codesign. Electrical pulses
in telegraph wires are paradigmatic examples of signals with
subpersonal content. It is crucial to note that this holds re-
gardless of whether the symbol strings they encode have any
further meaning. Simply being encoded and decoded by a
codesigned signaller-receiver pair is enough to count as a
contentful signal. In the special case of MCT, what signals
signify is another string of symbols.
The consequences of this perspective will be crucial for
understanding the relationship between MCT and biological
signals, including animal communication. First, notice that
what is quantified by transmission rate is the efficiency of
joint function. The only goal of the central MCT model is
to reconstruct a source message at the target. This is true
whether the signal is a crucial battle order or a nonsense
string compiled by an infant. Its success in this endeavour
is what is quantified by transmission rate.12 Maximum pos-
sible success is quantified by channel capacity. What is al-
most universally ignored is that message reconstruction is
not the only joint goal whose efficiency can be quantified in
this way. Signals need not stand for and produce strings of
symbols, as they inevitably do in MCT.13 They can stand for
states of affairs and produce behaviour directly, without fur-
10 There is at least one prominent school of dissent to this orthodoxy,
in the shape of the sender-receiver paradigm headed by Brian Skyrms
(2010). Though Skyrms accepts that the total quantity of information
in any given signal is silent on its content, he proposes a definition
of information content that makes use of informational measurements
(Skyrms, 2010: §3). Importantly, it does not cut between signals and
cues. Like ORR’s definition of Shannon information, it is defined in
terms of probabilities, not function. In what follows I leave the Skyrms
account to one side. Though it is useful and innovative, there is a much
more direct way to demonstrate the relationship between information
in MCT and meaning in biological signals.
11 “Subpersonal” is applied to brain states that are not assumed to
play a role in conscious thought. I use it here as a modifier to “con-
tent” that makes no assumptions further than codesign of signallers and
receivers. It is therefore applicable to subcognitive and non-cognitive
systems in the manner of Shea (2007) and Millikan (2013).
12 Measured in bits per symbol, not per second.
13 Oliver Lean has made the same point (Lean, 2016: 239-40).
ther symbolic intermediaries. The honey bee waggle dance
is a canonical example.
The perspective of subpersonal content therefore affords
both a naturalistic approach to meaning as well as insight
into the special nature of the MCT model. There is one fur-
ther consequence worth mentioning, that highlights an im-
portant but tacit assumption lying behind at least one of
ORR’s objections to information-talk (see section 5.1 be-
low). In many discussions of this and related topics, “in-
formation” is taken to imply an exclusively indicative cor-
respondence between signal and world. This can be seen
whenever it is cashed out in terms of the probability of an
outcome, correlations between events, a relation of standing-
for, or what a receiver could infer from the signal. What has
come out of the literature on subpersonal content is another
kind of correspondence between a signal and the world. Sig-
nals often bear an instructive element, being supposed to
bring about some state of affairs. This can be cashed out
in terms of favourability of an outcome, or of what a sig-
naller can control. Signals may be more or less instructive
or informative; in the simplest systems characterised by full
common interest they possess both aspects to the same ex-
tent.14 To continue our earlier example, an encoded message
in the central MCT model equally informs the receiver about
the source message and instructs it which target message to
produce. Because the literature on information theory places
so much emphasis on inference, this instructive aspect of
signals is often missed.
In sum, the traditional distinction between semantic in-
formation and formal measures of transmission in commu-
nication channels is misguided. By neglecting the special
nature of the MCT model, scholars have improperly adopted
Weaver’s irrelevance claim in domains where it does not be-
long. I now turn to a more pressing objection for the use of
information theory in behavioural ecology.
4.3 Information, costs and benefits
Sarkar (2013: 200-1) offers a further challenge to this con-
strual of information. Although animals’ evolutionary in-
terests can be furthered by certain behavioural strategies,
and although these strategies sometimes require coordina-
tion with other animals, describing and explaining optimal
behaviour never requires information-theoretic formalism.
Speaking of the honey bee waggle dance, he claims “we
can quantify the loss of optimality (e.g. as a function of the
departure from optimality of resources gathered relative to
14 Signals with this dual character were labelled “neutral” by Lewis
(1969), “pushmi-pullyu” by Millikan (1995) and “primitive” by Harms
(2004). The latter is the preferred term. Incidentally, it might be thought
that the instruction/information distinction is just another way of de-
scribing the influence/information distinction. Unfortunately, the latter
is far more ambiguous.
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foraging effort) with no recourse to ‘information’ ” (Sarkar,
2013: 201).
On the surface this claim seems plausible. Recall Hal-
dane and Spurway took one piece of statistical data, the stan-
dard deviation of the Gaussian distribution, and converted it
into a measurement of transmission rate. It is not clear what
that latter calculation adds to an evolutionary analysis, since
describing and explaining optimality seems to require only
tallying costs, benefits and probabilities. As it stands, how-
ever, Sarkar’s claim is unsubstantiated. As Sarkar rightly
notes, many previous attempts to quantify aspects of animal
signalling systems measure only the entropy of signalling
repertoires, if they measure anything at all (Sarkar, 2013:
§4). The best chance of extending the concepts of MCT to
animal signalling theory might be to explain the form of a
signal by reference to the signallers’ need to coordinate. As
well as correspondences between signal and world, proper-
ties such as redundancy and noise contribute to this analysis.
A signal is a piece of behaviour, and like behaviour more
generally it can be optimised. The mathematics describing
the optimal form of a signal, where signaller and receiver
are codesigned, is communication theory.15
In their more tempered approach to redefining animal
communication, Krebs and Dawkins (1984: 396) suggest in-
formation theory might be best suited for an analysis of sig-
nalling economics rather than measuring bit rate. Striking a
balance between energy expended on signalling and ensur-
ing sufficient coordination falls neatly into the optimisation
paradigm already well-deployed for individual behaviours.
It does not seem implausible that this can be extended to
joint behaviours, nor that some appropriate generalisation
of communication theory can play a role in the mathemati-
sation of this extension.
On reflection, at least part of the reason why it is difficult
to draw insight from Haldane and Spurway’s measure is that
it is difficult or impossible to measure costs and benefits,
hence difficult to estimate the parameters of ‘waggle dance
economics’. Sections 2 and 3 are dedicated to establishing
that Haldane and Spurway measured something real – the
transmission rate of the waggle dance of von Frisch’s bees
– and that their results were not arbitrary, contrary to recent
objections. To go beyond this, we would need to add hy-
potheses about the selective environment of the honey bee
and the context in which signals were useful (Preece and
Beekman, 2014). We would need to target specific hypothe-
ses about the process by which the primordial cue became
the contemporary signal. This would likely involve compar-
15 The distinction between code-as-correspondence and code-as-
redundancy mirrors a well-known duality in communication theory
between data compression (‘source coding’) and data transmission
(‘channel coding’). Speculatively, the selective pressures on animal
communication may be skewed far more towards solving the latter
problem. Hailman’s book (Hailman, 2008) and Wiley’s essays (Wiley,
1983, 2013) are examples.
ative work on dialects between different species and sub-
species (Beekman et al., 2015). None of this threatens the
literal truth of the information rate measure, though it may
make it difficult to integrate it with other empirical work. In
particular, I concur with Sarkar that we have reason to be
agnostic about the significance of Wilson’s comparison be-
tween the signalling rates of honey bees and fire ants (Wil-
son, 1962). I am sceptical that this comparison could be
meaningful without significant assumptions about the forag-
ing ecology and evolutionary history of both bees and ants.
Comparing transmission rates may be no more valid than
comparing costs and benefits between very different species.
For closely related species this might be a useful tactic. But
in most cases, such comparisons are meaningless.
5 Extending the method to other cases
Several reasons counted in favour of using the bee dance as
a case study. Through decades of research there is plenty of
data available on bee dances and their effect on compatriot
bees. Research continues, and any empirical hypotheses pro-
duced by the theoretical work advocated here could be tested
on several subspecies. In addition, since bee sociality is rel-
atively recent and quite diverse (Danforth, 2007), links be-
tween communication and cooperation could be investigated
in depth using the bee family. With regard to honey bees,
strong eusociality entails a negligible threat of freeriding or
defection. It is reasonable to assume signalling is fully co-
operative, avoiding complex problems of cross-purpose and
deception. But the question must be faced what becomes
of this methodology in cases where few or none of these
assumptions hold. In this section I consider what we have
learned so far in the light of more pressing objections.
5.1 Explanations of signalling behaviour must not ignore
physiological constraints
As a consequence of the abstraction required for informa-
tional description, the question of behavioural and develop-
mental constraints has often been ignored. Animals do not
have great freedom of action, and natural selection does not
have free rein in shaping their behaviour. That many pur-
ported instances of signalling can be shown to be distinctly
manipulative is a consequence of this fact (Rendall et al.,
2009: 237) (Owren et al., 2010: 766-7). Consider two popu-
lations of signallers and receivers without perfectly aligned
interests, such as males and females of a single species. Sup-
pose, as a general rule, overt behaviour can adapt faster than
the cognitive architecture underlying perception. Then re-
ceivers will often lag behind in the perceptual arms race.
Signallers will be quick, on an evolutionary scale, to ex-
ploit perceptual biases while receivers will be slow to rectify
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them. Receiver responses are then determined by trade-offs
between the need to respond to relevant perceptual stimuli
without being duped too harshly.16
This story of trade-offs goes beyond signals that are ‘about’
something, such as male quality, and includes behaviours
that cannot be evaluated in terms of honesty. ORR point out
that many examples of what we typically think of as sig-
nals are not (or only degenerately) contentful, because their
function is tied specifically to receiver affect or attention.
For example, males of some fish species display colouration
similar to that of their female receivers’ prey, the point be-
ing to catch a female’s attention (Owren et al., 2010: 767).
Importantly, being better at attention-grabbing need not cor-
relate with quality. The reason for this male adaptation is
not a corresponding female adaptation. It is a prior female
adaptation for an entirely different function.
There seem to be three intertwined issues here. First,
traits and behaviours designed as attention-grabbing appear
not to be contentful. Second, physiological constraints play
a larger role in shaping the form of the signal than is usually
afforded by information optimists. Finally, male colouration
is not a consequence of coadaptation. I deal with the third
problem in the next subsection, and will speak now to the
problems of content and constraint.
In the example, fish colouration is not contentful because
it does not correlate with anything. Note, however, that the
assumption lying behind this objection is that informational
language entails that signals indicate a state of the world. As
argued in section 4.2, signals can also contain instructions
how to act. This could include an instruction to “pay atten-
tion”, opening the channel for further signalling. Of course,
this still requires coadaptation, and by assumption the fish in
the example do not meet this condition. I deal with this wider
problem in the next subsection, but the point to take away
here is that coadapted instructive signals need not have the
familiar indicative content usually assumed by paradigms
like costly signalling theory.
Consider now physiological constraints. The informa-
tional approach seems to assume the form of a signal should
be somewhat divorced from its content, so that it can be
freely optimised for reliable transmission. But signalling be-
haviours whose form is primarily attributable to physiologi-
cal and developmental constraints are not apt for this expla-
nation. It looks like we need an evolutionary communica-
tion theory, one that considers optimal joint behaviour from
the perspective of restricted design capabilities. Models of
communication from an evolutionary perspective would af-
ford much less freedom of choice of encoding. In particular,
the code – the form of the signal – that develops through co-
evolution will be simultaneously constrained by competing
16 Though see Bergstrom and Lachmann (2003) for conditions under
which the slower-evolving organism enjoys the benefit, a phenomenon
they call the Red King effect.
adaptive needs of both the signaller and receiver. Crucially,
it could still be the case that coadaptation plays a role in ex-
plaining signal form, even though several different kinds of
constraint play a role too. In the case of the waggle dance,
certain physiological constraints have been proposed to ex-
plain a systematic error in dance performance (Preece and
Beekman, 2014). This is the kind of hypothesis that could
be integrated with a formal approach to signalling theory,
provided that other concerns detailed in this paper are ad-
dressed.
ORR have clearly presented important considerations for
evolutionary perspectives on communication. All behaviour
is subject to physiological and developmental constraints.
Natural selection does not give rise to perfect forms. Evolu-
tionary models tend to make assumptions trading realism for
tractability. We must at least find some way of incorporating
proximate constraints into these investigations.
5.2 Explanations of signalling behaviour must not ignore
divergent interests
Continuing the example from the previous section, there were
three conditions that the fish signals failed to meet: being
contentful, being designed with few or no constraints, and
being coadapted. I agree we must accommodate a broad-
ened perspective on the first two conditions, but see no rea-
son why a mathematical toolkit provided by a generalised
communication theory should not play a part. Now consider
how the informational approach should deal with ‘signals’
that are not the result of coadaptation.
One option here is to reject that those traits are signals.
They seem instead to be the logical converse of cues: corre-
lated behaviour that occurs for the signaller’s benefit rather
than the receiver’s. The traditional distinction becomes a
tripartite carving between cues, signals and manipulations.
ORR include the latter two categories in their redefinition of
signalling. I want to highlight that it is at least possible to
separate them, though I accept that the attractive symmetry
of the tripartite distinction is unlikely to be representative of
our asymmetric world.
Just as with cues, manipulations blend into signals when
previously unidirectional influence become coadaptive. These
three categories are rough coverings of many possibilities.
Evolutionary game theory is explicitly designed to study
these situations. In particular, work inspired by Skyrms’s
sender-receiver framework has explored the limits of com-
munication in non-cooperative settings (Wagner, 2012, 2015;
Martı´nez and Godfrey-Smith, 2016), as well as different rates
of evolution (Brusse and Bruner, 2017). Further, making this
distinction will likely help ORR achieve at least one of their
goals. They aim to stop theorists searching for the wrong ex-
planations of signalling behaviour. By adopting a third cat-
egory, they can vividly point out that the majority of cases
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are closer to manipulations than coadapted signals. This al-
lows us to distinguish cooperative situations, typified by the
social insects, from those with multiple conflicting evolu-
tionary forces.
All these problems were part of the motivation of Dawkins
and Krebs’s original suggested redefinition of signalling:
To summarize the point of view we are adopting:
as an inevitable byproduct of the fact that animals
are selected to respond to their environment in ways
that are on average beneficial to themselves, other
animals can be selected to subvert this responsive-
ness for their own benefit. This is communication.
(Dawkins and Krebs, 1978: 285)
The authors explicitly conflate manipulations and coadapted
signals. By contrast, the informational approach highlights
an important difference between them. Just as parasites must
walk a fine line between exploiting and destroying their hosts,
so signallers must find a balance between reliably manip-
ulating receivers and driving them out of existence. Basic
models proceed on the assumption that signalling can only
exist when some mechanism helps maintain equilibrium, pre-
venting one or both parties going extinct. One obvious ex-
ample of such a mechanism is when the same behaviour
brings benefit to both signaller and receiver. In these cases
there is an element of common interest, hence there will be
some level of coadaptation. The signal is then partly amenable
to analysis in terms of information and encoding.
Above we agreed theoretical and modelling work should
continue to expand its horizons regarding manipulation and
constraint. Now we can better see the motivation behind
costly signalling theory. One party in an interaction charac-
terised by partial common interest may be at risk of extinc-
tion, but which one (and why) will be an empirical question
in each case. The mechanisms evolution has thrown up that
manage to prevent extinction, thus prolonging signalling be-
haviour, may be many and varied. Part of the work of theory-
building is to find a taxonomy of such mechanisms and out-
line their symptoms, which can then act as diagnostics for
field workers to employ (see for example Hurd and Enquist
(2005)). Dawkins and Krebs promote the view, later picked
up by ORR, that in the vast majority of cases we will find
general-purpose receiver perceptual mechanisms being ex-
ploited by special-purpose signalling behaviour. So be it:
theoretical work will uncover a wider class of forces than
those manifested in nature.
All of this is apt – none of it threatens our account of
information. Evolutionary game theory is designed to ex-
plore interactions of divergent interests, and it shades into
communication theory when the interests are common and
there are fewer physiological constraints. Molecular biology
is working in this direction (Iglesias, 2016; Nakano et al.,
2013), sharing with social insect studies the freedom to ig-
nore divergent interests. But weakening the assumption of
common interest does not mean we cannot use mathemat-
ics to describe it. It means that the mathematics gets more
general and its interpretation perhaps more obscure. It also
means there will be mechanisms other than ‘honesty’ main-
taining signalling interactions, and that we should not nec-
essarily look for static equilibrium behaviour, but ongoing
arms races. Sarkar believes that none of this mathematics
will have anything to do with information theory. Through-
out this paper, I have tried to show that is an overly narrow
conception of the links between communication theory and
game theory.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I have focused on the honey bee waggle dance,
demonstrating how directional information in the dance is
measured. The quantity of information derived is a measure
of the accuracy of receiver bees. Increased accuracy entails
increased efficiency of finding food over a blind search strat-
egy. Clearly these considerations have relevance for the fit-
ness of foragers, and the colony as a whole. The objection
that information measurements are arbitrary, or have no rel-
evance for fitness, cannot be sustained.
Several obstacles stand in the way of attempts to gener-
alise this approach to other cases of animal signalling. For
one thing, signal form is not always explicable by refer-
ence to coadaptation. The definition of encoding advocated
here will not be available. Further, it is still unclear how to
unify informational measurements with fitness cost. It seems
likely modelling work will continue even while it remains
difficult to test with empirical examples.
However, genuine concerns should be distinguished from
those raised due to misunderstandings of communication
theory. Claims about the undefinability of information, or its
irrelevance for semantic meaning, or the arbitrariness of its
measurement have been criticised here. In particular, claims
about the irrelevance of communication theory for seman-
tic information are typically confused. The central model of
MCT employs symbols that stand for symbols, which is why
the meaning of one of those sets of symbols is irrelevant
for quantification. But it is the function of the other set, the
meta-symbols, that is quantified by transmission rate, and
whose design is optimised for better performance. Future
work will seek to characterise far more vividly the relation-
ship between evolutionary game theory and an empirically
informed evolutionary communication theory.
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